Graduate Student Works

WW Campus for Central & South America

11-2019

An Evaluation of the Operational Restrictions Imposed to
Congonhas Airport by IAC 121-1013
Glanski O.C. Pacheco Jr.
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

Marcus Camargo
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/brazil-graduate-works
Part of the Aviation Safety and Security Commons, and the Management and Operations Commons

Scholarly Commons Citation
Pacheco, G. O., & Camargo, M. (2019). An Evaluation of the Operational Restrictions Imposed to
Congonhas Airport by IAC 121-1013. , (). Retrieved from https://commons.erau.edu/brazil-graduateworks/8

This Capstone is brought to you for free and open access by the WW Campus for Central & South America at
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Works by an authorized administrator
of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

An Evaluation of the
Operational Restrictions
Imposed to Congonhas
Airport by Civil Aviation
Instruction 121-1013
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Aviation Management Program – Class of 2019

AN EVALUATION OF THE OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED TO
CONGONHAS AIRPORT BY CIVIL AVIATION INSTRUCTION 121-1013

by

GLANSKI O C PACHECO JÚNIOR
MARCUS CAMARGO

A Capstone Project Submitted to Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Aviation Management Certificate Program

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Sao Paulo, Brazil
November 2019

AN EVALUATION OF THE OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED TO
CONGONHAS AIRPORT BY IAC 121-1013

by

GLANSKI O C PACHECO JÚNIOR
MARCUS CAMARGO

This Capstone Project was prepared and approved under the direction of the
Group’s Capstone Project Chair, Dr. Leila Halawi
It was submitted to Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Aviation Management
Certificate Program

Capstone Project Committee:

___________________________________________
Dr. Leila Halawi
Capstone Project Chair

___________________________________________
Xxxxx X. Xxxxxx, XX
Subject-Matter Expert

________________
Date
ii

Acknowledgements
Firstly, we would like to thank Dr. Leila Halawi for leading the way and make this
project possible.
We are thankful to our company colleagues that provided technical support, making
substantial questions about the research.
Additionally, we are especially grateful to the Flight Engineering Department that shared
their wisdom and experience with us.

iii

Abstract
Group:

Glanski O C Pacheco Júnior
Marcus Camargo

Title:

An Evaluation Of The Operational Restrictions Imposed To Congonhas
Airport By IAC 121-1013

Institution:

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

Year:

2019

The objective of this study is to propose a review of the operational restrictions
imposed on Congonhas airport by IAC 121-1013, seeking a balance between flight safety
and operational efficiency.
The researchers calculated the landing performance (using specific software),
taking into account particular aircraft system failures that increase landing distance. The
results indicated that the measures imposed by the IAC have little or no effect on the
operational safety increase. Additionally, the restrictions created operational complexity
for the airport and reduced its efficiency by impacting airline costs. At the end of the
study, the researchers suggest a reissue of the IAC based on the data presented.
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Chapter I
Introduction
São Paulo - Congonhas Airport is the second busiest airport in the country. It
represents one of the essential hubs for business and figures as the most profitable route
in Brazilian domestic operation, being the connection between Rio de Janeiro and São
Paulo. Its strategic location, in the center of Sao Paulo, benefits the agenda of
businesspeople, allowing quick access from the office to air transportation. In 2018, more
than 21 million passengers passed through Congonhas Airport.
The airport was founded in 1936, and the city of Sao Paulo developed around the
airport. The city growth limited the possibilities of building a better passenger terminal
and runways. At the same time, there is no medium-term alternative to offer air transport
for more than 21 million people attended by the airport.
In July of 2007, Congonhas airport runway was the protagonist of the most
significant Brazilian air crash in history, where 199 people died. An Airbus 320 from
TAM Airlines performed a runway excursion and collided with a building nearby the
runway threshold.
The accident caused a huge national commotion, demanding immediate official
actions and measures to prevent new events from taking place in the airport. At that time,
media speculations stated that the junction of a considerably short runway with a
potentially slippery runway condition, associated with the heavy-aircraft operation, was
incompatible and significantly dangerous.
Together with these assumptions, the aircraft involved in the accident was
dispatched with one Engine Thrust Reverser inoperative (which is a routine operational
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condition). But under the public sight, the lack of an engine reverse sounded like one of
the first accident causes. Consequently, the intense public pressure over the government
led the authorities to untimely restrict the Airport operation.

Project Definition

Congonhas airport operational limitations were implemented before the
conclusion of the official investigation.
In other words, the operational limitations measures were imposed to give a quick
answer to the public outcry increasing the airport operational safety margin.
More than ten years after the accident, the researchers’ focus is understanding if
the limitations imposed on the airport operation indeed represent an increase in safety
margin avoiding a new event. Or, if the constraints are oversized, raising costs solely,
without a definite increase in safety. At the same time, the researchers will highlight the
impact on the airport operation.
These restrictions were issued during the investigations and implemented through
the Civil Aviation Instruction IAC 121-1013, published on April 1st, 2008, impacting the
heavy-jets operation and, as a result, the airlines.
Below are the IAC 121-1013 main restrictions:
•

Minimum Equipment List

•

Limitation of Extra Fuel load

•

Wet runway landing obligations:

•

Prohibition of takeoff and landing
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Project Goals and Scope

Until now, the same restrictive measures remain in effect. The central
objective of this study case is to deep-dive into Congonhas IAC121-1013
measures, analyzing its technical background and safety effectiveness. At the
same time, the researchers will evaluate which measure the Advisory Circular hits
the spot, increasing safety, and which is only detrimental to the efficiency of air
transportation.
As CGH is one of the most critical HUBs in the country, any limitation to
its capacity represents a significant impact on airlines and users. In the limit,
lower capacity means higher fares.
Since the event of the accident, several technologies have been
implemented by the aircraft manufacturers, which allow the pilot to evaluate in a
more precise way the impact of any failure in the landing distance performance.
This study will expand the analysis of the measures applied to the
Congonhas Airport through the IAC121-1013, highlighting the actual causes of
the accident based on the official conclusive investigation.
One of the new technologies the researchers will explore during our study
is the use of Electronic Flight Bag (EFB).
The implementation of the landing performance assessment through EFB
allows pilots to have a realistic scenario and precise calculation of the landing
condition, even in the case of failures or items deferred by the aircraft Minimum
Equipment List (MEL).
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The result of this study will be presented to the aeronautical authority. The
researchers will request to revisit the restrictions imposed by the IAC 121-1013
and propose new measures foreseeing to make aircraft operation in CGH more
efficient as well safe.
.
Definitions of Terms

Actual Landing Distance is the distance used in landing and braking to a complete
stop (on dry runway) after crossing the runway threshold at
50 feet.
Electronic Flight Bag is an electronic device that helps flight crews perform flight
management tasks more quickly and efficiently, providing
precise calculations and information.
Extra fuel

Additional fuel supplied above the minimum required by
legislation

Landing distance

Actual landing distance is the distance used in landing and
braking to a complete stop (on a dry runway) after crossing
the runway threshold at 50 feet.

Minimum Equipment List is a list that provides for the operation of aircraft,
subject to specified conditions, with particular
equipment inoperative (which is) prepared by an
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operator in conformity with, or more restrictive
than, the MEL established for the aircraft type.
Required Landing Distance is the distance obtained through the application of a
factor to the actual landing distance.
Runway Excursion

A veer-off or overrun off the runway surface.

List of Acronyms
AC

Advisory Circular

AFM

Aircraft Flight Manual

ALD

Actual Landing distance

ANAC

Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil

ARC

Abnormal Runway Contact

CENIPA

Aeronautical Accident Investigations and Prevention
Center

CFIT

Controlled Flight IntoTerrain

CGH

IATA code for Congonhas airport

EFB

Electronic Flight Bag

FCOM

Flight Crew Operating Manual

IAC

Civil Aviation Instruction

LOC-I

Loss of Control in Flight

MEL

Minimum Equipment List
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TALPA ARC

Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment Aviation
Rulemaking Group

RE

Runway Excursions

RESA

Runway End Safety Area

RBAC

Regulamento Brasileiro de Aviação Civil

RLD

Required Landing Distance

SCF

System/Component Failure

SOP

Standard Operating Procedure

Plan of study

The researchers will evaluate the restrictions currently applied at Congonhas
airport after the 2007 accident. This analysis will include four parts: an introduction; an
in-depth review of all the regulations regarding the landing safety, the basic regulation
like RBAC 121, and an analysis of the restrictions applied in CGH.
In part three, the researchers will review all the restrictions applied through the
IAC 121-1013 in Congonhas airport, analyzing the effectiveness of the landing safety.
Finally, in part four, the researchers will present a proposal for the IAC 121-1013
based on the conclusions of this study.
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Chapter II
Review of the Relevant Literature

Introduction
To understand all the motivations behind the CGH IAC 121-1013 as well as the
characteristics of Congonhas Airport at the time the restrictions were published, the
researchers will present relevant regulation and documentation that in this chapter.
Two pillars are considered fundamental by the researchers to perform air
transportation. The first pillar is the safe conduction of operation, and the second is the
economic viability of the operation and its efficiency.
Therefore, the researchers are committed to understanding to which extent the
operation limits imposed to Congonhas Airport operation indeed became safety
improvements, and what represents efficiency loss solely.

Background

In 1996, eleven years before the 2007 accident, Congonhas Airport was the scene
of a Fokker 100 crash, killing more than 100 people a few minutes after takeoff.
The cause of the accident was a failure in the aircraft's reverser system that was
spuriously deployed, not allowing the plane from flying after takeoff.
Due to the repercussion of this accident and other minor crashes, the airport is
known by the public’s opinion as a critical airport and has always been in the headlines of
Brazilian newspapers.

15

At the beginning of 2007, the pavement of the runway at Congonhas airport was
restored. The purpose of the work was to eliminate the surface irregularities and prevent
water accumulation, which was both considered a chronic runaway problem.
The process of restoring the runway pavement was done in steps. After the
pavement restore process was ready, more time was needed until the runway could be
grooved (cuts in the runway surface transversely to the pavement centerline).
The airport authority decides to authorize the runway operation with the grooving
pavement service not ready to avoid operational disruptions.

Aeronautical Accidents Categories

To better understand and separate similar events, the accidents are classified.
Aviation organizations worldwide define more than 40 different accident categories.
According to the study, A Statistical Analysis of Commercial Aviation Accidents 19582018 (AIRBUS, 2019), the five more significant accident categories are:

•

Runway Excursion (RE): a lateral veer off or longitudinal overrun off the
surface, not caused by any system failure or malfunction or abnormal runway
contact. Therefore, the TAM accident is classified as a RE.

•

System/Component Failure or Malfunction (SCF): Failure or malfunction of
an aircraft system or component, related to either its design, the manufacturing
process, or a maintenance issue, which leads to an accident. SCF includes the
powerplant, software, and database systems.
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•

Loss of Control in Flight (LOC-I): Loss of aircraft control while in flight, not
primarily due to SCF.

•

Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC): Hard or unusual landing, not primarily due
to SCF, leading to an accident.

•

Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT): In-flight collision with terrain, water, or
obstacle without indication of loss of control.

According to the Airbus study, Runway Excursions (RE), including both lateral
and longitudinal types, are the third more important cause of fatal accidents by numbers,
and the single most significant cause 15% of hull losses. (AIRBUS, 2019)
In Figure 2.1 below, the researchers can see how significant the contribution of
runway excursions to total accidents is, where more than 35% result in aircraft losses.

Figure 2.1 - Percentage of hull losses by accident category 1999-2018
Runway Excursions are very related to the subject of takeoff and landing
performance assessment, the researchers recognize the importance of this data, with
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significant industry efforts to reduce these numbers. The researchers consider any
reduction in the operating safety margins to be non-negotiable.
One of the last efforts to avoid RE was the development of a new methodology
for conveying current runway conditions. This methodology is based on
recommendations from the Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA)
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC). These recommendations are currently being
adopted in Brazil, and it has already been implemented in takeoff and landing
performance assessment throughout the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB).

JJ3054 2007 Air Crash in Congonhas Airport

On 17 July 2007, the flight JJ3054, an Airbus model 320 (registration PR-MBK),
departed from Porto Alegre (POA) to Congonhas Airport (CGH) with 181 souls on
board. The flight can be considered as routine up to the landing.
One central issue was that the plane was dispatched with Engine two reverser
pinned (de-activated), by MEL.
Before JJ3054 landing, according to CENIPA’s Final Report, Congonhas Tower
informed that the active landing runway (RWY35L) was wet and slippery. As stated in
the background section, to avoid disruptions in air operations, the airport authority
decided to authorize the runway operation without the grooving pavement.
During the landing run of JJ3054, the aircraft didn't slow down as expected,
leading to a runway excursion, overrunning the left edge of the runway near the departure
end. The plane crossed over the Washington Luís Avenue and collided with a building
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and with a gas station. All souls on board plus 12 people on ground perished
(CENIPA,2009, pg.71).
According to CENIPA, the inoperative Engine Reverse played a central role in
the accident. Table 2.1 below shows several occurrences related to mistaken thrust levers
setting. The pinned reverser landing procedure is directed related to these incidents,
which are not limited to Airbus aircraft:
DATE

AIRCRAFT

LOCATION

08/Apr/1983

B747

Karachi – Pakistan

30/Mar/1985

A300

Perpignan – France

06/Apr/1987

B747-300

Rio de Janeiro – Brazil

12/Sept/1998

DC-10

Denver - USA

22/Mar/1998

A320

Bacolod – Philippines

28/Aug/2002

A320

Phoenix – USA

18/Oct/2004

A320

Taipei – Taiwan

05/Nov/2005

B747

Paris – France

19/Dec/2003

B737

Libreville - Gabon

14/Dec/2005

B747

McGuire AFB – USA

12/Jun/2006

A310

Irkutsk - Russia

Table 2.1 - Accidents related to a mistaken thrust lever setting (CENIPA, 2009, pg. 58)

Among the accidents listed in table 2.1, two occurred in similar conditions as the
flight JJ3054: Philippines and Taiwan. In both cases, one reverser was deactivated
(pinned). And pilots kept one thrust lever in CL position, bringing only one thrust lever to
IDLE, preventing the aircraft from decelerating.
Due to these events, Airbus changed the A-320F MEL pinned reverser landing
procedure regarding the thrust levers setting after touchdown.
Aiming to make the pilot job simpler, Airbus made the procedure the same as the
standard landing procedure with both reversers available. So, at the time of the TAM
19

accident, the landing with one inoperative reverser MEL procedure required that after
touchdown, both thrust levers moved to "REV," instead of only one lever.
When the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) was decoded, investigators
concluded that “the FDR did not record any thrust lever movement of the number 2
engine (the one with the pinned reverser), from the moment it was positioned at “CL”, up
to the collision of the aircraft”(CENIPA, 2009,pg.74).
With one thrust lever in CL position and the other in IDLE, JJ3054 aircraft had
one engine still producing forward thrust, and one engine reversing. Consequently, the
spoilers and auto brake also didn’t activate. The aircraft kept high speed consuming the
total length of the runway, with energy high enough to veer off and crash into the
buildings on the other side of the avenue.
The CENIPA Final report issued several recommendations to the Congonhas
airport operators. One of the restrictions was the prohibition of operation when the
aircraft presents one reverser inoperative. According to CENIPA Final Report:
“Despite the fact that the reverser is a complementary decelerating system not considered
for the calculation of the landing distance (dry runway), it is a component whose
contribution to the braking of the aircraft is significant. Especially when operating on the
runway with reduced dimensions and with a problematic historical background, as was
the case of the Congonhas runway” (CENIPA Final Report, pg. 81).
According to CENIPA Final Report, the inoperability of one engine reverser
could have somehow influenced the pilot, from a psychological perspective, although the
flight was conducted following the manufacturer recommendations to this failure.
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Congonhas Civil Aviation Instruction - IAC 121-1013

One of the ANAC regulatory publications is the Civil Aviation Instruction (IAC).
The IACs aims to establish procedures or clarify rules or requirements contained in the
RBAC related to civil aviation (IAC 001-1001A, pg 4). The Brazilian IAC is similar to
the FAA Advisory Circular
In April 01st of 2008, ANAC issued the Congonhas Civil Aviation Instruction
(IAC 121-1013). The purpose of this IAC was to establish additional technicaloperational procedures and requirements necessary to authorize the safe operation of
large reaction transport aircraft at Congonhas Airport (São Paulo).
The Congonhas IAC 121-1013 represents a compilation of operational safety
recommendations emitted by CENIPA during the accident investigation.
The following IAC 121-1013 restrictions impact on Airline operations:
•

Landing operation in the case of any MEL dispatch with inoperative systems that
compromise landing performance, such as command surfaces, brakes, reversers,
etc.

•

Landing operation in the case of In-Flight failures where “inoperative instruments
or equipment that compromise the aircraft landing performance, such as
command surfaces (ailerons, flaps, slats, spoilers), brakes, reversers, etc.).”

•

Wet runway limitation
•

Landing with tailwind

•

Five knots reduction on the FCOM maximum crosswind landing value

•

Takeoff with reduced thrust (Derated or Flex)
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•

The auxiliary runway operation when transporting passengers is prohibited

•

Dispatch limited to 3 tons of EXTRA FUEL.
It is essential to notice that the operational limitation imposed on Congonhas do

not touch thrust levers mishandling. The practical result of the industry is a more
complex operational scenario for pilots and airlines.
After applying the IAC 121-1013 in routine operation, it became evident that
flights are more prone to diversions and cancelations. Once the IAC directives are
restricting landings that would be allowable in other similar airports.
For example, suppose that during a regular flight to CGH, the pilot faces a failure
in Landing Gear Control and Interface Unit (LGCIU). This failure affects the reverse
operation. In terms of performance, there are no landing increments or penalties, but, due
to the IAC 121-1013, the flight is forbidden to land in CGH, being forced to divert to
another airport.
Congonhas is the second most crucial HUB in Brazil. If even routine minor
failures can avoid aircraft from landing in CGH, it is also true that the Maintenance
Centers located in Congonhas will be affected. If, in most cases, the aircraft is obliged to
divert (to Campinas VCP, for example). The airline has to deal with a double operational
disruption: fix the aircraft out of the main Base and also accommodate the passengers of
the diverted flight.
On a lower scale, we have the tailwind together with a wet runway prohibition.
This limitation follows the same path of all IAC121-1013 restrictions, which does not
authorize the landing even if the assessed aircraft performance permits.
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A Review of Approach and Landing Regulations

As seen on the IAC 121-1013 section, the Congonhas IAC imposed limits (or
prohibition) to the landing operation depending on the aircraft conditions.
Before making any suggestion to the IAC 121-1013, in the first place, it is
essential to fully understand the official regulation fundaments behind the Landing
Distance assessment.
As previously mentioned, the Runway Excursions (RE), is the third most
important cause of fatal accidents, and the single most significant cause of hull (fuselage)
losses (AIRBUS, 2019). Therefore, it is crucial to mention all the regulations behind the
landing distance calculation as well as the measures taken by the industry to reduce
accidents related to a runway excursion.

Definitions

The Approach-and-landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) issued by the Flight
Safety Foundation (FSF), defines the Actual Landing Distance (ALD) as the distance
used in landing and braking to a complete stop (on a dry runway) after crossing the
runway threshold at 50 feet. It represents the landing distance published on the Aircraft
Flight Manual (AFM) by manufacturers and is also the origin of all other landing distance
calculation (Flight Safety Foundation, 2009)
The Required Landing Distance (RDL) is the distance obtained by the application
of a factor to the ALD. RLD is used during the flight dispatch process.

23

RBAC 121

In Brazil, the flight dispatch process is regulated by the RBAC 121. This
regulation is mostly a transcript of the FAR 121, following aviation standard best
practices.
The researchers focused on RBAC 121 to highlight the regulation regarding
landing performance calculation. RBAC requires that the destination landing distance is
calculated before takeoff, during the dispatch process.
According to RBAC 121.195, it is not allowed to take off a turbine engine
airplane in such a way that upon arrival, it exceeds the AFM landing weight. In other
words, the RBAC 121.195 prevents an aircraft from being dispatched above the
maximum landing weight for a given location. Additionally, the RLD should consider the
weather forecast for the landing time and apply dry and wet runway safety factors.
Additionally, the RBAC 121.195 says that the aircraft shall land at the destination
aerodrome using 60% of the runway length (1.67 factor) and passes 50 feet above the
runway threshold (RBAC 121.195, p.45).
Besides, the RBAC 121.195 also states that when the weather forecast indicates
that the destination aerodrome runway may be wet or slippery at the estimated landing
time, no Dispatch will be allowed unless the runway length is at least 115% (1.92 factor)
of the actual landing distance for the specific conditions (RBAC 121.195, p.42).
In figure 2.2 below, the researchers can see the requirements and factors that must
be applied to the actual landing distance.
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Figure. 2.2 Landing distance dispatch requirements
In simple words, any aircraft must be dispatched to an airport without a landing
analysis saying that the actual landing distance multiplied by the factor of 1.67 (dry) or
1.92 (when forecast wet) is following runway length from the destination airport.
The factor mentioned above intends to determine a safe operational runway length
and provide a realistic level of performance accounting normal operational variability in
day to day service (FAA 121.195):
•

Runway surface conditions;

•

Piloting techniques;

•

Tire and brake deterioration;

•

Atmospheric instability such as gusts of wind shear;

•

Crosswinds;

•

Approach to touchdown; and

25

•

Flightpath deviations.

Runway End Safety Area (RESA)

Several safety recommendations came during the JJ3054 accident investigation,
which meant to bring additional safety margins to the Congonhas Airport operation.
On 17th Sept of 2007, CENIPA issued a central recommendation determining the
establishment of the Runway End Safety Area (RESA) in Congonhas Airport (CENIPA
Final Report, page 103). The proposal is based on the ICAO Annex 14, which establishes
high priority to the RESA implementation.
Runway End Safety Area (RESA) can be defined as a symmetrical area along
with the runway axis extension, primarily used to reduce the risk of damage to aircraft
during takeoff and landing in the event of overshoot, undershoot or excursion (RBAC
154, 2019).
Houses and buildings surround Congonhas Airport; therefore, there was no room
to extend the runway to implement the RESA. Consequently, the runway was virtually
reduced, to accommodate a 280 meters RESA, following RBAC 154, as shown in figure
2.3.
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Figure 2.3 Runway End Safety Area (RESA)

In-Flight Landing Distances

After departure, landing distances verified at the flight dispatch process are
disregarded. Once airborne, pilots are required to compute the in-flight landing distance,
instead of the flight dispatch landing calculations.
The in-flight landing distance assessment takes into account the current aircraft
status, actual runway conditions, and possible performance degradation generated by
failures during the flight that may affect the landing distance.
The way these in-flight landing distance assessments are performed has
significantly changed over the past decade.
Inflight landing distance (IFLD) calculations used to be solely performed thought
paper tables available in the cockpit. Such tables required calculations and interpolation
methods. Due to the nature of the activity, and considering the cockpit environment, pilot
workload, among others, this process could lead to imprecise results. Furthermore,
depending on the scenario, such as multiple failures, paper tables can also be challenging
and time-consuming.
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Electronic Flight Bag (EFB)

The Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) is an electronic management device (portable or
installed) that allows pilots to perform the necessary calculations more quickly and
efficiently with less paper. It is a computing platform aiming to reduce, or substitute,
paper-based material such as performance tables, documentation such as aircraft
operating manual, navigational charts (offering moving map for air and ground
operations), performance application software designed to automate tasks typically
conducted by hand, such as performance take-off and landing calculations (FAA AC 12076D, 2017). Figure 2.3 is an example of portable and installed EFBs.

Figure 2.4 – Installed and portable EFB examples

The EFB has several benefits over conventional methods:
•

Reduces, in some cases, eliminates paper in the cockpit, reducing the
flight crew workload.

•

Rapid access to information, raising efficiency in day by day service and
emergency.
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•

Dedicated software can perform the necessary calculations, which were
previously completed by hand. It reduces paperwork and reduces the space
for human error.

•

Accurate takeoff and landing performance calculation. Thus enhancing
fuel consumption and aircraft engine life.

•

Improved safety and flight efficiency throughout precise onboard
calculations, and thus eliminating work previously completed by hand.

•

It makes it possible to exchange information, enabling the flight crew to
access the latest data.

•

Real-time weather information.

•

Flight reports can be rapidly sent.

•

Electronic document storage getting pilots and cockpit rid of hard copies,
which are naturally difficult to keep updated.

As stated above, one of the central advantages of the EFB over previous
methods is performance applications, which makes the calculations faster and more
accurate, reducing human errors.
The Airbus EFB applications will be the example for this study.
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Airbus Electronic Flight Bag Performance and Manual Application (FlySmart Plus)

Flysmart+ Ops Lib
Flysmart + Ops Library is an application designed to enable access to all Airbus
operational manuals (FCOM, MEL, FCTM, AFM) and in-house manuals. Airbus Ops
Library Browser offers an easy way to navigate through all Airbus manuals (thanks to
hyperlinks) fully integrated and linked to Flysmart+ Takeoff and Flysmart+ Landing
applications.
Flysmart + TakeOff
Flysmart + TakeOff permits compute Airbus aircraft takeoff performance. The
optimization process provides optimum Takeoff weight or Flexible temperature based on
the actual weather conditions and actual aircraft configuration (considering selected
differed MEL and CDL items, if any). Flysmart + TakeOff features enhance graphics
regarding runway information, which drastically increases situational awareness.

Flysmart+ Landing
Flysmart + Landing compute aircraft landing performance (dispatch or in-flight
assessment). The optimization process provides optimum results based on the actual
weather conditions and actual aircraft configuration (considering selected differed MEL
and CDL items and ECAM alerts if any).
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Flysmart + Landing features enhanced graphics on runway information, which
drastically increases situational awareness.

EFB Calculations and Actual Landing Distance Calculation Comparison
Differently, from the dispatch landing distance assessment, the EFB In-Flight
Landing Distance considers a comprehensive analysis to determine the landing distance
performance. While the previous Actual Landing Distances paper methods are
determined considering:
•

Flying an optimum flight segment from 50 feet over the runway threshold
to the flare.

•

Firmly touchdown (not extending the flare).

•

Use maximum pedal braking

According to the Flight Safety Foundation, these published landing distances are
seldom achieved in line operations (ALAR, 2000).

Figure 2.5 - Actual Landing Distance
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Figure 2.6 shows an example of an actual landing distance paper table, with all the hand
corrections that must be accomplished by the pilots.

Figure 2.6 - Actual Landing Distance

EFB Landing Calculation
As shown in figure 2.6, the calculations performed by the EFB consider a 7
seconds flare in the In-Flight Landing Distance. This extended flare time adds a
protection layer. As it is closer to the pilot line operation real scenario, instead of flying
directly onto the ground aiming a firm touchdown.
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Figure 2.7 – Flare time used in EFB calculations

Aiming to present the EFB potentialities as well as the information provided, you
can follow below figure 2.7 and figure 2.8, showing an Airbus 320-214 landing dispatch
and in-flight landing performance calculation on both Congonhas runways.
17R DISPATCH - DRY

35L DISPATCH - DRY

Figure 2.8 – RWY 17R and 35L RLD at Dispatch

33

The researchers can observe that there are no limitations on Runway 17R/35L for
dry conditions, allowing the landing at the maximum landing weight (MLW) 64.5 tons.
It is essential to understand that in case of a wet runway forecast, the flight would
be automatically dispatched with the 1.92 factor, instead of 1.67.
According to TALPA ARC, during the in-flight landing distance assessment,
pilots should apply a safety margin of at least 15 percent (factored landing distance) when
based on manual wheel braking.
One of the configurations options that determine safety margins is the selection of
auto brake. If the manual braking distance provides a 15 percent safety margin, then the
braking technique may include a combination of auto brakes and manual braking. Even if
the selected auto brake landing data does not provide a 15 percent safety margin.
For study purposes, all calculations will consider manual braking selection. This
selection is the most conservative configuration and is the threshold of the utilization of
auto brakes with the 15 percent safety margin.
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17R IN FLIGHT - DRY

35L IN FLIGHT - DRY

Figure 2.9 – RWY 17R and 35L In-Flight landing distance

In Figure 2.9, despite the thrust reverse being taking into account only for wet
runway landing distance calculations, the reverses were applied in both scenarios.
As stated earlier, the SBSP runway has been virtually reduced to include a 280meter RESA.
In table 2.3 below, the researchers can observe all the values presented in figures
2.7 and 2.8.

RWY

DISPATCH
DRY
MLW/RDL/MARGIN

IN-FLIGHT
DRY
MLW/LD/FLD/MARGIN

17R

64.5/1645/15

64.5/1164/1339/321

35L

64.5/1645/15

64.5/1173/1349/311

Table 2. – Dispatch and In-Flight Landing computation for RWY 17R and 35L
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Chapter III
Methodology

This chapter describes the methodology used by the researchers to understand the
impacts caused by IAC 121-1013 applied in Congonhas Airport, comparing to the desired
increment of safety margin intended by the IAC. Researchers applied all restrictions
imposed by IAC121-1013 to quantify their practical impact on IFLD operating margins.

Theory of Constraints
To improve operating efficiency and maintain flight safety excellence, the
researchers applied a method to find the most significant constrains, their opportunities
for improvement, and the impacts of their implementation on efficiency and safety.
A theory choose to guide researchers in the Theory of Constraints (TOC). TOC is
widely used to improve the efficiency of business operations. Developed by Eliyahu
Goldratt (The Goal, 2004) allows researchers to perform an analysis using the five steps
described below:
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Figure 3.1 – Theory of Constrains
Identify the constraints
In our study case, the restrictions imposed on the Congonhas Airport operation
will be treated as the constraints. The list of restrictions considered are:
•

Minimum Equipment List items that affect the landing distance

•

Limitation of Extra Fuel load

•

Wet runway landing obligations

•

Prohibition of takeoff and landing from the auxiliary runway

Exploit the constraints
This is one of the most critical phases in our process, as reviewing safety
recommendations applied to an accident requires precise criteria. Through an analysis of
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the purpose of constraints and their effectiveness, the researchers consider that one
enforced restriction must be maintained so that all others can be reevaluated.
The application of RESA on the 17R / 35L runway in Congonhas airport
increased the safety margins and allowed us to evaluate the removal of the remaining
restrictions. Using the EFB tool, the researchers can accurately verify how far such limits
could be modified.
Subordinate the constrains
In this step, researchers must evaluate all the processes necessary to remove the
process safely. Questions such as: Do we have the tools needed to remove it? Do pilots
and operators have the training to operate them and act in case of contingencies? Does
the removal of restrictions comply with regulations?
Subjecting initiatives to validation is critical to maintaining safety margins and
collaborating with the final step to assess the consequences and effectiveness of actions.
Elevate the constraint
This process seeks to increase capacity by raising the constrains. In an air
operation, there will always be restrictions or risk-mitigating measures. The goal is to
achieve maximum performance within these limits.
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Repeat
Repeat is the last step that leads us to make a final assessment of the measures.
This step puts us in the process of continuous improvement because by solving a
problem; we can create other needs. In our study case, we focused mainly on maintaining
safety margins and identifying possible impacts that the removal of restrictions may have
on operations.
Congonhas IAC 121-1013 MEL Restrictions

As previously stated, Congonhas IAC doesn’t allow aircraft operating with MEL
differed items in which system and equipment inoperability could compromise braking
aircraft performance (increasing Landing distance). It is essential to highlight that this
prohibition applies even if the calculated actual landing performance fits the runway
length.
For this study case, the researchers will use the same tools available in the cockpit
to analyze and understand the impact of differed MEL items in landing distance
calculations and, consequently, in the safety margins. The EFB will be set up with the
corresponding landing data for all failures:
Weather settings
WIND º / kt:

000/0

OAT ºC:

15 (ISA + 5)

QNH hPa:

1013

RWY Condition:

Dry
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Aircraft Configuration
Landing Weight:

64.5 or the highest possible

Landing CG:

Basic

Flap Configuration:

FULL

Air Cond.:

ON

Anti-Ice:

Off

Approach Type:

Normal

Go Around Gradient: 2.5%
MAN LDG A-THR: ON
Brake Mode:

MANUAL

Reverser Use:

Yes

After presenting the calculations, a table will compare the safety margins without
failures, with the margins of dispatched MEL items, which operation is forbidden in
Congonhas.
Additionally, the researchers will make a comparison of the RLD assessment
done during the flight dispatch with the IFLD. The target of this comparison is to
highlight that the requirement of applying the factors of 1.67 / 1.92 in dispatch,
significantly reduces the exposure to higher payloads.
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One Thrust Reverse Inoperative – MEL 78-30-01A
RWY 17R DRY

RWY 35L DRY

Figure 3.2 – In-flight LD with One Thrust Reverse Inoperative

DRY
MEL ITEM

In-flight Landing Distance
LW

LD/FLD

Margin

17R
64.5
1164/1339
321
No Failure
17R
78-30-01
64.5
1205/1386
274
One Thrust reverser
35L
64.5
1173/1349
311
No Failure
35L
78-30-01
64.5
1215/1397
263
One Thrust reverser
Table 3.1 – Impact of MEL 78-30-01on IFLD

Observing figure 3.1 and table 3.1, the impact on landing distance is neglectable.
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Braking/Steering Control Unit (BSCU) System 1 – MEL 32-42-03A
RWY 17R DRY

RWY 35L DRY

Figure 3.3 – In-flight landing distance with (BSCU) System 1 Inoperative
DRY
MEL ITEM
17R
No Failure
17R
32-42-03A
BSCU 1
35L
No Failure
35L
32-42-03A
BSCU 1

In-flight Landing Distance
LW

LD/FLD

Margin

64.5

1164/1339

321

64.5

1399

321

64.5

1173/1349

311

64.5

1349

311

Table 3.2 – Impact of MEL 32-42-03A on IFLD
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In the failure presented in table 3.2, the Brake and Steering Control Unit 1 (BSCU
1) is backed-up by the BSCU 2. Even though the IAC121-1013 forbids the operation
when one BSCU is inoperative, there is no impact on landing distance.

Landing Gear Control and Interface Unit (LGCIU) 1 in-flight – MEL 32-31-01
RWY 17R DRY

RWY 35L DRY

Figure 3.4 – In-flight landing distance with LGCIU 1 Inoperative
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RWY 35L DRY
DRY
MEL ITEM
17R
No Failure
17R
32-31-01
LCGIU 1
35L
No Failure
35L
32-31-01
LGCIU 1

In-flight Landing Distance
LW

LD/FLD

Margin

64.5

1164/1339

321

64.5

1184/1361

299

64.5

1173/1349

311

64.5

1193/1372

288

Table 3.3 – Impact of MEL 32-31-01 on IFLD

The LGCIU 1 failure shown in table 3.3, is a no-dispatch condition; this means
that the aircraft will not take off when this failure is present. However, in case it occurs
during the flight, the EFB can calculate the landing distances.
The EFB offers calculations taking account systems failures that could impact the
landing performance, being precise even with multiple failures. The landing performance
calculation outputs take less than 30 seconds to be electronically presented for pilots.
Taking a closer look at the landing distance numbers for LGCIU 1 failure, the
researchers observe that the impacts are not significant. Once again, even though the
calculation assures that the operation even with the LGCIU 1 is possible, the IAC 1211013 doesn’t allow such operation, once the LGCIU 1 failure affects the Reverser 1
(inoperative).
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Spoiler Elevator Computer (SEC) 1 – MEL 27-94-01A
RWY 17R DRY

RWY 35L DRY

Figure 3.5 – In-flight landing distance with SEC 1 Inoperative RWY 17R

DRY
MEL ITEM
17R
No Failure
17R
27-94-01A
SEC 1
35L
No Failure
35L
27-94-01A
SEC 1

In-flight Landing Distance
LW

LD/FLD

Margin

64.5

1164/1339

321

64.5

1236/1422

238

64.5

1173/1349

311

64.5

1246/1333

277

Table 3.4 – Impact of MEL 27-94-01A on IFLD
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The Spoiler and Elevator Computer 1 failure have a minimum impact on landing
distance. Even though the landing with SEC 1 failure is possible according to the EFB
calculation, the IAC121-1013 doesn’t allow such operation, as long as the operation
without spoiler is forbidden.

Limitation of Extra Fuel load

The extra fuel is all the additional fuel supply to a flight above the minimum fuel
required, respecting the regulations. The CGH IAC121-1013 forbids airlines from
supplying their aircraft with more than 3 tons of extra fuel.
The IAC objective is to limit the aircraft landing weight.
But the IAC doesn’t establish an Alternate airport distance. So, in case the flight
is planned with a distant alternate airport, there will be less extra fuel “hidden” in the
alternate airport route.
In other words, the alternate airport could be used to manipulate the extra fuel.
And instead of choosing a 1-hour distant alternate airport, the flight dispatcher can select
a 2-hour distant airport, and the minimum fuel required will be increased. The aircraft
will be landing with a higher landing weight despite the limitation of extra fuel.
The industry has a practice of transporting extra fuel loaded in airports where
the price is lower. This practice makes it worthy to carry the extra fuel to an airport where
the price is higher. This practice is called tankering. (Thumber, 2015)
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Wet Runway Landing Obligations

Tailwind is a significative landing distance factor. In other words, the higher the
tailwind, the longer will be the landing distance (Flight Safety Foundation ALAR, 2000)
On the other hand, landing with a headwind is desired, as long as the headwind reduces
the landing distance.
So, figure 3.5 compares two different wet runways landing scenarios: 3 knots
headwind (HW3), with 3 knots tailwind (TW3). Obviously, for the same aircraft weight,
the tailwind will produce more landing distance. But, as previously mentioned, the
research methodology consists of analyzing the landing performance under the IAC1211013 restrictions and compare with performance assessment.
In figure 3.5, the first analysis considered 63.7 tons of Landing Weight, and for
the second scenario, consider a lighter weight of 59 tons of Landing Weight.
The landing distance calculated for both conditions is exactly (the same, A landing with a
headwind could have less margin at a specific landing weight that a landing in a
lightweight with a tailwind.
So, this restriction does not improve safety margins and is focusing on the wrong
parameter.
As an example, let us make a comparison of two flights with the same landing
margins, one with 3 knots of headwind and the other with 3 knots of tailwind.
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RWY 17R WET 63.7T HW3

RWY 17R WET 59T TW3

Figure 3.6 – Same margins with different wind direction

WET
WIND
17R
HeadWind 3 KTS
35L
TailWind 3 KTS

In-flight Landing Distance
LW

LD/FLD

Margin

63.7

1434/1649

11

59.0

1434/1649

11

Table 3.5– Same margins with different wind direction

In figure 15, it is evident that a restriction of the tailwind operation does not increase the
safety of the operation. It all depends on the landing weight of the aircraft. Of course, this
restriction could limit the MLW with a tailwind, but in fact, if the only reason to limit
operation is a reduction on safety margins.
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Prohibition of Flex Takeoff and Reduced Takeoff when the Runway is Wet

The use of the maximum thrust of an engine generates high costs and reduces the
engine life, so it is desirable to takeoff with reduced thrust setting whenever applicable
(Airbus FCOM, 2018).

RWY 17R WET 60T FLEX TO

RWY 17R WET 60T TOGA

Figure 3.7 – Flex and TOGA setting with the same Takeoff weight
In Figure 3.7, the researchers can see that even on takeoffs with smaller power
thrust setting, the safety margin is achieved. The limiting factor will always be the MLW
and not the determination of maximum power.
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Prohibition of Takeoff and Landing from the Auxiliary Runway (when transporting
passengers).
Neither the IAC121-1013 nor the Accident Final Report gives any explanation for
the prohibition of the Congonhas Airport's secondary runway operation for aircraft
transporting passengers.

Summary

This study aims to deeply analyze the IAC 121-1013 that restricts operation in the
Congonhas Airport. The IAC came as a response from the TAM airlines flight JJ3054
accident, which official investigation concluded that a pilot mishandling of the thrust
levers led to a runway excursion, killing 188 people on board.
The Final Investigation Report made several recommendations, such as training,
aircraft engineering changes, runway infrastructure enhancements, and operational
restrictions to Congonhas.
As a consequence, the IAC 121-1013 limited the operation in Congonhas with
any failure that could affect the landing distance performance. Under a first sight, it may
sound sensate. But, taking a closer look, these restrictions, create operational challenges
for pilots and airlines, with unclear increment in safety.
Minor failures (inflight or deferred by MEL) represents a normal operational
condition, being part of the routine of any airline. Therefore, limiting the operation in
CGH in such situations creates some additional challenges for pilots and maintenance
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management. Instead of executing the landing distance assessment considering the
failure (pair of spoilers, for example), the pilot is forced to divert, increasing costs, with
unclear gain in safety.
The landing distance assessment performed nowadays is a robust process
accomplished through the pilot EFBs (Electronic Flight Bag). This is a lot more accurate
and comprehensive method than previous paper tables, the only option available at the
time of the accident.
Together with a more precise landing distance calculation, came the ICAO RESA
(International Civil Aviation Organization Runway Extended Safety Area), that virtually
reduced the Congonhas runway in 280 meters. Consequently reducing the aircraft weight
and providing extra area for contingencies.
Putting all together, researchers intend to prove that most of IAC 121-1013
restrictions represent airline efficiency loss solely, with no increase in safety margin.
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Chapter IV
Outcomes
It has been twelve years since the accident. After all this time, the measures
imposed to Congonhas airport has not been revisited by authorities, even though after
new safety improvements (EFB and RESA) were implemented. The researchers are
proposing a review of the restrictive measures applied to Congonhas airport through an
analysis of the actual effectiveness and impact of the measures.
Some of the restrictions imposed are effective and must be maintained so that
safety margins can prevent a new runway excursion.
The airport-imposed restrictions may have made some sense just after the
accident, as long as the claim for an immediate response was too heavy. Authorities
should be given some answers to society after the deaths of 199 people.
On the other hand, after twelve years of passed, it is relevant to reanalyze the
measures under a new sight.
Under the researcher’s sight, there is one measure that was the most effective
decision at that time: the implementation of RESA. This measure brought a virtual (but
effective) scape area and increasing the safety margin. The RESA implementation allows
a takeoff and landing performance assessment with a component that brought a
measurable impact, mainly in the event of unexpected contingencies.
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Even though the implementation of the RESA may have brought payload
operational limitations, financially impacting the airlines, the decision was in line with
ICAO recommendation, bringing additional safety margin to operation.
All margins presented in this study have an additional 280 meters margin due to
the virtual reduction of the Congonhas runway, the RESA. So, in any case, every
presented landing margin has an extra 280m RESA. For instance, if we have an EFB
calculated margin of 300; in fact, there is a real 580 meters margin. Pilots and flight
dispatchers could not consider this margin during landing assessment. But it will be used
in case of emergency and will not be considered a runway excursion.
In the next sessions, the researchers will present the conclusions about each restriction
imposed.
MEL and IN-FLIGHT failures
Since the beginning of the study, researchers evaluate the effectiveness of the
restrictions applied to the Congonhas Airport operation.
Some of these restrictions were intended to mitigate risks focusing on the impact
that such failures could have on landing distance. The implementation of EFBs in aircraft
cockpits has allowed pilots to determine landing performance impacts and accurately
make decisions based on margins and visual presentations displayed on EFBs.
After performing the landing analysis of the main failures that affect landing
performance and comparing the respectively achieved margins, the researchers can
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conclude that the impact of the failures for the presented configuration and runway
condition is minimal and does not justify being in place.
In figure 4.1, the researchers can observe that the failures have minimal impact on
safety margins. In the worst-case scenario (SEC FAULT), the margin is 238 meters,
already included 15% for a factored landing distance. Including RESA, created by the
virtual reduction of the track, we have 518 meters, equivalent to 1700ft.

Figure 4.1 – IFLD and Margins for runway 17R (DRY)
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Wet Runway Limitations
Wet runway operation implies a reduction of takeoff and landing margins. The
primary purpose of the restrictions was to, somehow, compensate for the impact of these
reductions.
However, the researchers believe the virtual reduction of runway adds an extra
margin to the operation. And together with company policies and restrictions related to
the factored landing distance represents more precise risk mitigation.
Landing with tailwind
Tailwind operations have their limits set by aircraft manufacturers and in specific
operations by airline policies. Respecting the manufacturer's limitation, the main focus
for safe operation should be its safety margins.
Due to performance, it is preferable to land with a headwind. Therefore, airport
towers will generally set the landing runway observing the headwind criteria. On the
other hand, during unstable weather or wind direction transition, it is possible to operate
with a tailwind.
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Figure 4.2 – Same margins with different wind direction
Indeed, that tailwind reduces the aircraft landing performance, increasing landing
distance. However, researchers point out that tailwind makes the same effect on landing
performance as higher payloads, high temperatures, increasing the landing run.
In other words, safety margin can be understood as available landing distance in
exceedance of the required landing distance needed to make the aircraft perform a
complete stop. In the case shown in figure 4.2, the researchers can compare the “safety
margins” of two aircraft landing under different conditions: headwind and tailwind
(lightweight). Observe that there is no difference between margins. Although the margin
is the same, the tailwind operation (WET) is not allowed by IAC.
Concluding, limiting tailwind operation on a wet runway does not bring effective
risk management. Risk management is about making an accurate landing assessment with
up-to-date information and high situational awareness of flight crews
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Five knots reduction on the FCOM maximum crosswind landing value

Crosswind landing is a technique widely practiced by pilots in flight simulators.
The most significant concern of this operation is the possibility of lateral veer off.
Congonhas main runway is 45 meters wide, which is the standard width of almost all
runways in Brazil.
Therefore, the researchers could not find any relationship between the arbitrary 5knots reduction in crosswind limitations and risk mitigation, making this reduction
pointless.

Prohibition of Takeoff with Reduced Thrust (Derated or Flex)

Takeoffs with derated or flex power settings aim to reduce engine maintenance
and leasing costs (the lower the takeoff power, the higher the efficiency). These power
settings are used on long runways that allow for better Accelerating and Stop margins
management.
According to FCOM, the requirement for maximum power utilization is
justifiable on contaminated tracks or in the presence of heavy rain but has less impact on
the dump or wet tracks.
The researchers believe that the runway reduced power setting prohibition should
be applied only in cases of a contaminated runway or the presence of heavy rain. In other
cases, pilots and flight dispatchers should use EFB power settings.
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RWY 17R WET 60T FLEX TO

RWY 17R WET 60T TOGA

Figure 4.3 – Flex and TOGA setting with the same Takeoff weight
In Figure 4.3, the researchers can observe that in aircraft with the same take-off
weight (60T), there is an increase in Accelerating and Stopping Distance (ASD) that
results in a reduction in the final margin.
An aircraft taking off with TOGA thrust setting that rejects take-off at Decision
Speed (V1), when stopping the aircraft completely, will have 197 meters ahead. And the
aircraft taking off at Flex thrust setting will have 19 meters.
It is important to note that comparing several other runways or operations with
high take-off weights (including DRY runway), the industry accepts operation with small
take-off margins. This is usual for efficiency purposes. It is usual to obtain calculated
margins of 4, 3, or even 1 meter.
The EFB is set to maximize efficiency, therefore taking advantage of the entire
runway length, reducing take-off power as much as possible.
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Once again, the researchers must remember that the virtual reduction of the
runway (RESA), brought an additional 280 meters margin. Furthermore, all calculations
made by EFB are following take-off regulations. As long as the EFB takes into account
all relative environmental factors outputting a precise and conservative result, there is no
reasonable motivation to modify an already conservative operation.
Therefore, researchers consider the TOGA setting an unnecessary obligation.

Auxiliary runway operation
As the researchers stated in previous chapters, the Congonhas auxiliary runway
was closed for passenger transportation.
No reason was given.
Operationally speaking, the auxiliary runway will naturally not be used for takeoff
or landing due to its dimensioning (shorter than the main runway). On the other hand,
under very low weights, the runway is useful, mainly as an option for Air Traffic Control
fluidness.
As long as there is no reasonable motivation for auxiliary runway closure for
regular transportation aircraft, the researchers believe that the auxiliary runway should be
available, at least for takeoff operation, as it has a positive impact on air traffic control
management.

Dispatch limited to 3 tons of EXTRA FUEL
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This policy intends to reduce aircraft landing weight. The problem is that Extra
Fuel depends not only on the amount of fuel load but also on the way the flight dispatcher
distributed this fuel. Mainly, the planned alternate airport.
The same fuel quantity may produce different Extra Fuels depending on the
planned alternate airport.

CLOSEST ALT AIRPORT

LONGER ALT AIRPORT

SBCT/SBSP – ALT SBKP

SBCT/SBSP – ALT SBGL

FUEL (Tons)

FUEL (Tons)

DEST

1731

DEST

1731

RRSV

200

RRSV

200

ALT - SBKP

1335

ALT - SBGL

1821

HOLD

1.075

HOLD

1075

COMP

1.96

COMP

196

MFR

4537

MFR

5023

TANKERING

3.486

TANKERING

3000

BLOCK

8023

BLOCK

8023

TAXI

228

TAXI

228

TOF

7795

TOF

7795

EZFW

54500

EZFW

54500

TOW

62295

TOW

62295

LDW

60564

LDW

60564

Table 4.1 – Extra fuel manipulation with different alternate airports.
In table 4.1, the researchers can observe that the same amount of fuel, a close-todestination alternate airport will result in a higher Extra Fuel than a distant alternate
airport. So, in case the Extra Fuel is eventually greater than 3.000kg, the solution is
selecting a more distant alternate airport in the flight dispatch. Consequently, reducing
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the Extra Fuel, bring it to a value below 3.000. The result is that the final aircraft weight
will be the same.
The conclusion is that this policy fails to reduce the dispatched aircraft weight and
makes the pilot work even harder. Once the more fuel loaded, the easier it is the in-flight
fuel management. Therefore, researchers believe that authorities should review this
limitation.
Chapter V

Conclusions and Recommendations

Following an analysis of the presented data, the researchers conclude that IAC
played an essential role in calling attention to the Congonhas airport. The IAC reached
the goal at the time of the accident, as long as it created immediate additional protection
to the operation, compatible with the scenario in 2007. At the same time, responding to
society with quick emergency measures assuring the continuity of operation and giving to
the public a feeling that everything was under control.
After 12 years, new technologies and regulations implemented in the aviation
industry changed the game in terms of takeoff and landing performance assessment and
safety margin. The researchers believe it is time for an IAC review.

Conclusions
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Considering the new technologies and regulations, the researchers noted that most
of the implemented measures do not effectively increase operation safety. But these
measures are indeed adding complexity to the Congonhas environment and jeopardizing
efficiency.
The researchers identified that the ban of operation of aircraft dispatched with
MEL items that impact braking distance, wet runways, and tankering doesn’t represent
relevant safety increases. Once these failures have minimal impact on the aircraft
performance and they are all pre-accessed through a calculation tool, the EFB.
On the other hand, the RESA implementation, complying with the ICAO
recommendation, has effectively increased operating safety margins by providing safety
operation margin where it matters. Thus, providing additional space for the landing run.
The researchers agree that Congonhas, due to its characteristics, represent a
unique airport. Therefore, the regulatory agency, jointly with the airlines, must be
committed to preventing new accidents from occurring. In other words, the IAC must be
updated, not eliminated.
The researchers can observe that the restriction imposed on the operation related
to MEL items had its origin in the assumption that a possible dispatched MEL items can
lead to additional pilot mistakes. That is the limit, could cause an accident.
However, it is evident that the accident which motivated the Congonhas IAC was
a result of the wrong application of the operational procedures related to the reverse
thrust failure.
CENIPA final report stated: “Following the FDR, in the last 28 landing operations
performed, including the one of the accident, five different procedures for landing with a
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deactivated reverser were performed. Four of which not prescribed by the manufacturer.
The last three landings were made with distinct procedures” (CENIPA,2009, pg.63)
As previously stated, the aircraft mishandling happened in different airports
around the world. Limiting the operation solely in Congonhas doesn’t make any
reasonable sense. Well-trained pilots are prone to perform a safe operation, and it is
contradictory to prohibit operations with dispatched MEL items or simple failures to
increase safety. The legislation can never prevent failures from occurring, but it is
capable of ensuring companies to have well-trained pilots.
The use of new technologies can give pilots a more accurate perspective of the
landing and takeoff operation. EFB is a precise tool that enables pilots to quickly and
accurately analyze the operation, even with dispatched MEL items or failures. As noted,
the analyzed IAC-restricted items do not significantly impact aircraft performance in
comparison with normal operation.
Currently, some companies restrict airport operation to the flight captain, thus
obliging the most experienced pilot to operate. This is a valid mitigation measure, but the
researchers believe each company should evaluate it and implement it through airline
polices.
In all tests performed, the researchers found no evidence that takeoff and landings
with dispatched MEL items make the operation unsafe. What makes the operation safe is
the realization of a precise performance assessment with an up to date information.
Metaphorically speaking, the IAC mitigation can be compared to the prevention
of house robbery. Instead of increasing the effective measures to avoid the thieves from
breaking in, you prefer to tear the house down.
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Information Gained from the Study

The researchers are professionals currently working in the aviation industry
(operation), but none of us had actually realized the important changes that were
gradually implemented in the aircraft performance calculation and new regulation that
indeed increased safety.
At the same time, researchers also noticed with the study results that the actions
implemented by Congonhas IAC have few practical relations with the original
motivation, the Congonhas accident. So, the IAC was implemented mainly as an answer
to the public outcry, then a measurable increase in safety.

Conceptual implications

The study hit the spot in pointing out that the Congonhas IAC limited the
operation without bringing extra safety margin as the IAC was supposed to.
On the contrary, depending on the situation, the IAC can make the operation more
challenging. For instance, a simple in-flight failure as a BSCU fault (Brake and Steering
Control Unit). Today the IAC prohibits the operation in Congonhas even though there is
zero increase in landing distance. So, obeying the IAC, the pilot will have to divert the
flight to another airport. What if the weather in close airports are not good? The flight
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would be diverted to an airport, some times with worst weather conditions, impacting the
operation (flight delay, crew labor hours), instead of landing in the planned destination
(Congonhas), because a misdirected regulation says so.
Recommendations
Finally, as a recommendation, researchers want to propose the revisit of the
Congonhas IAC. Fundamentally, the new technologies (EFB) and regulations regarding
landing performance and safety are taken into account, consequently eliminating the
prohibition of:
•

Operation with MEL performance-affecting differed items;

•

Tankering limitation (3.000 kg);

•

Wet runway limitations

Limitations of the Study

Researchers have full access to Airbus documentation, which means that most of
the common aircraft performance can be considered as covered. The Airbus A320 is an
aircraft that is similar in size and weight as the Boeing 737-800; therefore, as a general
role, all conclusions and assumptions of the study apply to the B737s. But, it must be
stated that the calculations were not run for the Boeing family.
Another limitation is the absence of cost raise. The IAC limitations increased the
operation costs, but the researchers were not able to calculate this value.
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